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This article explores the complexities of introducing new contra ceptive technologies and applies these to the initiation of the subdermal contraceptive implant (implant) in the South African (SA) context. Using the World Health Organization (WHO)'s conceptual framework [1, 2] and other emerging literature, lessons are identified and key recommendations proposed.
Over the past decade there have been concerted efforts to promote longacting reversible contraceptive (LARC) methods in subSaharan Africa, especially the implant and the copper intrauterine device (IUD). [3, 4] These methods have high continuation rates compared with other methods and very high effectiveness (<1 unintended preg nancy per 100 womenyears). [5] It is estimated that almost 2 million unintended pregnancies could be averted over 5 years if only 20% of women in subSaharan Africa, currently using shorteracting methods (oral contraceptives or injectables), switched to the implant. [6] In this region, the contraceptive method mix has long been dominated by these shorteracting methods, which, when used correctly, are highly effective and acceptable to women. However, these methods are also associated with significant rates of discontinuation, incorrect use, poor adherence and consequent unintended pregnancy. [7] Similarly, SA's most commonly used contraceptive methods are the injectables, [8] depotmedroxyprogesterone acetate (DMPA) and norethisterone enanthate (NETEN), which account for half of contraceptive use nationally. [9, 10] The implant is registered for use in more than 100 countries worldwide, [11] including many in subSaharan Africa, where use has increased rapidly over the past decade. [12, 13] In 5 years, uptake doubled in Malawi, quadrupled in Tanzania, and rose more than 15fold in Rwanda and Ethiopia. [12, 14, 15] In Zimbabwe, for example, implant use increased from <1% in 1994 to 10% by 2015. [16] In 2014, SA introduced the implant -somewhat later than other countries in the region -in an effort to expand its method mix and especially to increase access to LARCs, which have been given centre place in the country's contraception policy. [17, 18] Aside from the effectiveness of LARC methods and the benefits of increasing method choice, [19, 20] the possible links between injectables (particularly DMPA) and risk of HIV acquisition provided an impetus for the introduction of alternative methods in SA. [18, 21, 22] The launch of the implant in SA was accompanied by much excitement and anticipation -it was the first new method introduced in the public sector in almost 20 years. Implant services were described as 'the biggest family planning programme SA has ever seen' , [23] with ≥6 000 healthcare providers trained with regard to implant provision, with a focus on insertion. Both the 5year, tworod levonorgestrel implant (Jadelle) and the 3year, singlerod etonogestrel implant (Implanon NXT) were registered with the SA Medicines Control Council for use, but only Implanon NXT was made available in public health clinics as part of the national contraception programme. Estimates of implant uptake in the year after launch ranged from 176 000, based on data reported to the District Health Information System (DHIS), to as high as 900 000, according to the Department of Health. [24, 25] Data from the subsequent years, however, showed an almost 50% decrease in insertion numbers year on year. [26] The number of insertions dipped considerably across all districts that reported these data CME (Table 1 , Fig. 1 ). The Demographic and Health Survey (2016) estimated im plant use at 8% for married and sexually active unmarried women. [10] Actual numbers of removals are not known, because these were not initially systematically recorded. However, some reports in the media suggested that early removals were common and that women faced difficulties in getting implants removed because of healthcareprovider resistance to removal. [27, 28] Therefore, while the introduction of the implant heralded an important step towards the strengthening of SA's contraception programme, and brings the country on par with its regional counterparts in terms of wider method choice, SA's implant programme is facing several challenges.
Many of these challenges are common to the introduction of new contraceptive technologies elsewhere. On occasion, the rollout of a new contraceptive method has been undermined by adverse events and negative user experiences related to inadequate quality of care, which even if uncommon, have resulted in adverse publi city, rumours and misperceptions. It is, therefore, timely and critical to reflect on lessons learnt from the early period of implant avail ability in SA, based mainly on the experiences and insights of the authors, all of whom are closely involved in the SA contraception programme. These lessons are placed in the context of similar expe riences of contraceptive introduction elsewhere. We classify these findings into six thematic areas, drawing on a WHO conceptual framework for the introduction of a contraceptive method, [1, 2] as well as subsequent literature on the topic. [2933] We then propose key steps that could reinforce and reconfigure the implant programme in SA.
Lessons learnt -six thematic areas 1. Learn from the 'boom-and-bust' phenomenon in family planning
The term 'boomandbust' in family planning describes the pheno menon in which there is an initial boom in the use of a new contra ceptive technology, coupled with excitement and optimism, followed by a rapid downturn due to unmet expectations and disappointment -the 'failed promise of the contraception revolution' . [33] Several contraceptive methods have had a particularly turbulent history, as summarised in Box 1. Concerns have been raised about the potential for the implant to follow a similar trajectory if lessons from the past are not heeded. [15] Importantly, the boomandbust phenomenon in family planning can have farreaching, longterm, negative consequences, creating a climate of mistrust and lack of confidence in a method, or even in family planning services, more broadly. These effects may be experienced many years afterwards -for both providers and consumers -and may result in withdrawal of the method. [2] The boomandbust concept explicitly acknowledges the impor tance of closely monitoring the introduction of a new method, and then swiftly recognising and addressing the causes of any downward turn in uptake or acceptability more generally. Accurate data on uptake, pharmacovigilance, and levels of discontinuation or removal and reasons thereof are especially important.
Promote informed choice
In the enthusiasm of introducing a new, promising contraceptive meth od, there may be a tendency to promote that method over others, [2, 7, 37] both programmatically and at the level of individual providerclient interactions. This bias, which may be overt or subtle, may result in the provision of incomplete information and counselling, the overselling . [26] (No data are available for the Eastern Cape, the Free State, Mpumalanga, North West and the Western Cape before April -June 2015.) 
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of the benefit of the new method, a lack of acknowledgment that each contraceptive method comes with advantages and disadvantages, and that the importance of these differ from person to person. Within the early stages of the implant programme in SA, concerns arose that con traceptive users were not being given an adequate choice of methods, with the implant being strongly promoted as the firstline method, and with insufficient counsel ling about possible sideeffects or alternative contraceptive options.
Avoid over-emphasis of method technology and technological advantages
A focus on technological advantages of the implant, e.g. its long term action, high efficacy and costeffectiveness, may overshadow a woman's personalised experience of the method, especially the impact and tolerability of sideeffects. Most importantly, a preoccupation with the long-acting dimensions of the LARCs can result in pre eminence being given to the continuation rate as the indicator of success and acceptability. If that occurs, then early removal is seen as problematic and even as wasteful, and may generate resistance among healthcare providers to performing early removals. [31] In SA, an overemphasis on the notion of '3 years of use' perhaps has meant that the programme did not adequately anticipate and prepare for early removals, as these were viewed as signalling a failure of the programme rather than merely a reflection of the varying needs of women over time, which is to be expected and should be planned for. Implant removals are common across all settings. For example, about a quarter of women discontinued within the first year of use in studies in the Netherlands, [38] the UK and Australia, [39, 40] as well as other settings. [14, 15] Also, the reality of early removal levels may not always match perceptions, e.g. in Ethiopia concerns arose about early removals, but an evaluation showed that only ~2% of implant users had discontinued the method by 6 months. [41] It is important to keep implant removals in perspective -because the implant requires healthcareprovider intervention for removal, providers generally hear of and see women who are dissatisfied with the method and/or who request removals, and not the many 'silent' women who are satisfied with the method and only return to the clinic after 3 years. Furthermore, healthcare providers are generally not accustomed to having to actively manage discontinuation of contraceptives. Women discontinue pills or injections on their own, contributing to the perception that there is a higher rate of implant discontinuation compared with other methods.
Conceptually, thinking and language need to move away from the notion that the implant is designed to be used for a certain number of years, to the more nuanced message that it can be used for a number of years if women choose to do so. [1, 31, 42] Key to improving implant provision is understanding the reasons for early removals, e.g. are these due to inadequate counselling; dissatisfaction with the method; lack of support while using the method, including assistance in dealing with sideeffects; or women no longer being sexually active or wanting to become pregnant?
Focus on quality standards and overall access, rather than targets for an individual method
Internationally, it is common practice to make contraceptive programmes heavily target driven, and although this is often well intentioned, it may compromise quality of care. [15] An example is target setting for training, which occurred in SA, with a focus on numbers of providers trained, rather than on quality of training and documenting provider proficiency outcomes. The number of devices inserted is also often target driven, and can occur at the expense of oversight of the quality of care provided. [42, 43] While there are merits to setting targets, e.g. around overall contraceptive prevalence in a country, indicators need to centre around access, which includes dimensions such as quality of services and client satisfaction, rather than merely uptake.
Adoption of innovative, acceptable and comprehensive service-delivery models
Innovative models of service delivery warrant consideration, drawing on experiences from other settings. For example, the use of dedicated, specially trained providers might be more appropriate where new clinical skills, such as implant removals, are difficult to roll out to large numbers of providers. In 2008 2009, Zambia trained 18 retired midwives and deployed them to highvolume, publicsector facilities, solely for the provision of LARC services over 14 months, which showed a marked increase in uptake over a short period of time. [14, 44] A key challenge for implant service delivery is getting the balance right in relation to training on insertions and removals. The pattern of introducing implants and focusing training on insertions and not
Box 1. Boom-and-bust of contraception methods
• The Lippes Loop IUD, introduced in 1960, was aggressively promoted in India, with 'loop squads' and cash incentives, and >2 million insertions were done between 1965 and 1967. [34] Very high levels of early removal have been mostly attributed to overzealous persuasion of women to use the IUD, with little attention to method choice, counselling about method disadvantages, and possible sideeffects, e.g. bleeding and cramping. The India Family Planning Programme also failed to address widespread rumours, misconceptions and cultural issues relating to the device. [34] The shortcoming of the Lippes Loop introduction negatively impacted IUD use in India for many years. [1, 35] • The Dalkon Shield IUD, which was introduced as a 'safe' alternative to the oral contraceptive pill in the 1970s, was the target of legal action in the USA, and the subject of extensive negative publicity, and was ultimately removed from the market. While removal of the device was justified, as it was determined that a structural flaw in the device caused septic abortions and pelvic infections, this controversy contributed to negative perceptions about safer, newgeneration IUDs, and is partially responsible for the lingering, even though now disproven, concerns about IUDs causing pelvic inflammatory disease. [36] This experience highlights the need to invest effort in debunking misconceptions and providing correct information. • Another example is provided by Norplant. This sixrod subdermal progestinonly implant, was seen as a major breakthrough in contraceptive technology when it was introduced in several countries, including the USA, UK and Indonesia, in the 1990s. Accusations of failure of the manufacturer to disclose sideeffects led to litigation in the USA. Although the litigation was ultimately unsuccessful, it was accompanied by negative publicity and, along with problems in other countries, contributed to Norplant's withdrawal from the market in 2006. [29] Other problems with Norplant related to quality of care, including mass insertions, called 'safaris' in Indonesia, leading to perceptions of client coercion; [30] inadequate provider training and lack of competency in insertion and removal; accusations of healthcare worker resistance to removal; and poorquality counselling. [31] on removals, has repeated itself across countries. [14, 19] This approach is based on the assumption that there would be a window of several years in which to do this training. Also, practically, it is difficult for healthcare providers to learn how to perform removals at the onset of a programme, when few insertions have been made. Often, there is intent to do training on removals, but once the implant is introduced the momentum for training dissipates. Clearly, access to quality removal services from the onset of an implant programme is essential. Many countries have underestimated the number of women who would request removals before 3 years. [14, 15] Failure to provide accessible removal services is an infringement of women's rights, and may impact negatively on the community's perception of the implant. Expanding the choice of contraceptive methods does not necessarily result in increased utilisation if constraints in the health system and the needs of the end user are not taken into account. [2, 31] A holistic perspective is called for, tailored to the social, cultural, and personal norms and values that influence patterns of use in a particular context. Such a perspective explicitly acknowledges that the implant is most often used by healthy women, who may not be willing to accept side effects, [37, 45] many of which are genuinely uncomfortable. [2, 14, 45] The needs of women also change with age. Of note, adolescents have specific considerations, which are best met within the context of youthsensitive services. [4648] Little has been done to promote the implant among SA adolescents, with a commonly held perception that the method is more suitable for adults. Several studies, however, show that the implant is highly acceptable to young women, [49, 50] with continuation rates of ~80% after 12 months, [51] including in studies in subSaharan Africa. [52] Lastly, the importance of demand creation, community engage ment, sensitisation and addressing of concerns as they relate to a woman's life and context requires emphasis. [53] This involves genera ting a dialogue and structured engagement with programme planners, health workers, communities and end users to identify and address barriers. [14, 32, 53] Nongovernmental organisations, researchers and technical assistance agencies could all make an important contribution to such efforts.
Ensure a rights-based approach
The abovementioned lessons draw together important strands, which locate the promotion of the implant within the context of sexual and reproductive health and rights. [13, 5457] A rightsbased approach is especially important given that, historically, family planning program mes in SA have been associated with coercion. [58, 59] Most importantly, services must take into account the gamut of social, cultural and relational factors that influence contraceptive uptake and continued use. Each new method carries a set of tradeoffs for healthcare systems, providers and end users that will influence acceptability and continued use. [2] Therefore, options based, rather than directive counselling, is required, so that the implant is not recommended above other methods. Effectiveness is only one of many criteria that determine the optimum method for a woman at a particular point in time, and other factors may guide her choice, including how frequently she has sex, her partner's involvement, her fertility desires, and cultural or personal issues relating to sideeffects. Sensitivity and attention to these dimensions ensure that clients are informed and have agency regarding method selection, and continuing or discontinuing use.
Recommendations
Based on the lessons described above, we propose the following priority recommendations to support SA's implant programme:
Capacity building for healthcare providers
• The expanded provision of new and refresher training courses for healthcare providers, which cover technical skills around insertion and removal, informed decisionmaking and choice for women, preinsertion counselling, especially around sideeffects, and long term support and management of sideeffects. • Capacity building needs to strengthen provider confidence and competence in insertions and removals, recognising that this requires an investment in quality training, effective supervision, structured mentorship and accessible onsite support. • Training and support need to include more nuanced counselling, which should address issues such as changes in bleeding patterns and how this may affect women's lives, e.g. the cost of sanitary wear and sexual relationships. Reassurance and competent management of sideeffects play a major role in determining whether a woman chooses to continue the method. • A skills and human resource assessment needs to be done, espe cially in relation to implant removals, and measures should be put in place to address gaps. • Training needs to focus on the most recent WHO medical eligi bility criteria guidance for the implant, in particular the suitability of implants for women of all ages, including adolescents, and highlight potential advantages of the method for this group.
Clear communication to healthcare providers and end users regarding drug interactions
• Clear communication needs to be provided for both healthcare providers and end users where drug interactions might be a potential problem, including for those on treatment for tuberculosis (TB), HIV or epilepsy. [60, 61] In the presence of ambiguity, healthcare providers understandably err on the side of caution, either not offering implants to potentially eligible women or unnecessarily encouraging removal.
Data collection and monitoring systems
• Address data gaps in recording of uptake, removals and pharmaco vigilance, including use of the implant in women with medical conditions such as epilepsy, HIV and TB. • Disaggregate implant data by age (especially to identify use among adolescents and young women) and by specific groups of women, such as postpartum and postabortion patients. This can then be used to identify gaps in provision, training, quality of care, and factors influencing uptake and continuation.
Increase demand
• Adopt innovative servicedelivery models, which could include 'reintroducing' the implant (and other LARC methods, such as the IUD) in selected districts; engage with communities in terms of myths, misconceptions and women's experiences with the method; and debrief healthcare providers about their experiences with the method and their concerns.
Assess the feasibility of further expanding the contraceptives available in the public sector
• Contraceptive use may be increased by expanding the range of methods available to accommodate different needs. [20] The SA contra ception policy recommended a 5yearly review (2012 2017). [17, 62] This is now imminent and presents a window of opportunity to review the guidelines. More specifically, based on the concerns raised in this article, the review should consider uptake of and barriers to the use of all methods. With the emergence of new data, further consideration should be given to different contraceptives among women at risk of HIV and those CME infected with HIV or TB, including guidance on contraceptive prescribing and drug interactions.
Conclusion
Problems and challenges encountered during the introduction phase of the contraceptive implant in SA are not unique, and mirror experiences elsewhere. Lessons learnt elsewhere provide valuable insights about the healthsystem elements required to support service provision and demand creation, as well as ensuring that these take place within a rightsbased framework. It is critical to heed these lessons, identify and analyse problems and deal with them effectively to ensure success of implant introduction.
Real or perceived concerns about new methods, such as the implant, may discredit the use of methods by current and potential users, communities and healthcare providers. It is imperative that the potential contribution of the implant to women's health in SA is not undermined by unsubstantiated negative publicity and misconceptions, or by the unwarranted importance assigned to removal rates not supported by data.
Addressing the skewed contraceptive method mix in SA and promoting a greater choice of methods, including the implant, require nuanced provider training and sensitivity, novel healthsystem support, intensive community engagement, consumer awareness, and systems for programmatic monitoring, evaluation and quality improvement. While this article specifically addresses issues relating to implants, many of these reflections may apply to the strengthening of other LARC methods, such as the IUD, and indeed, the contracep tive programme as a whole.
